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LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE REGULATED 
INDUSTRIES: THOUGHTS ON PROFESSIONAL 
ROLES INSPIRED BY SOME RECENT 
ECONOMIC LITERATURE 
Charles Donahue, Jr.* 
THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS. 
By Alfred E. Kahn. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 1970. 2 Vols. 
Pp. xii, 212; xiii, 352. $20.90. 
THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO A CURRENT IssuE OF PUBLIC POLICY. Edited by Paul W. MacAvoy. 
New York: W.W. Norton 8c Co. 1970. Pp. xii, 212. $2.25. 
PERFORMANCE UNDER REGULATION. Edited by Harry M. Trebing. 
East Lansing: Inst. of Public Utilities, Michigan State University. 
1968. Pp. xx, 169. $6.00. 
UTILITY REGULATION; NEW DIRECTIONS IN THEORY AND POLICY. 
Edited by William G. Shepherd & Thomas G. Gies. New York: Ran-
dom House. 1966. Pp. xii, 284. $2.95. 
I. THE REGULATORY CRISIS AND THE NEW GURU 
It is now becoming painfully apparent even to the consuming 
public that something is seriously wrong in the traditional regulated 
industries.1 The death of intercity rail transportation and the gift 
of its corpse to Amtrak, the recurring summer "brown-outs" in New 
York City, the difficulty of obtaining a dial tone in the same City, 
the chaos in international air fares, and the rationing of natural 
gas in many parts of the country are but examples of a larger malaise. 
Although the whole economy is currently beset by difficulties, those 
of the regulated sector seem considerably greater than those of 
the rest of the economy. Nor can the difficulties in that sector be 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1962, Harvard University; 
LL.B. 1965, Yale University.-Ed. 
I would like to thank my colleagues Thomas Kauper, Donald Regan, and Peter 
Steiner for stimulating and useful comments and suggestions. Peter Steiner, in par-
ticular, l1elped me considerably in sharpening the focus of the piece and in avoiding 
both economic and legal errors. Of course, the fuzziness which remains and any sur-
viving errors are solely my responsibility. · 
I. Throughout this review the term "regulated industries" refers to those indus-
tties, usually called common carriers or public utilities, which are subject to price 
and entry regulation. Included are much of surface and air transportation, leased 
communications like telephone and telegraph, and much of the energy industry. Broad-
casting, which has its own peculiar problems, is not included, nor are those industries, 
like insurance and banking, which, though heavily regulated, do not display "natural 
monopoly" characteristics. 
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attributed entirely to failures of management, though management 
in some portions of the sector has not always been in the finest 
American tradition. 
There is, in fact, substantial reason to believe that the problems 
of the regulated industries are in large measure due to regulation, or, 
to put it slightly more broadly, to a failure of public policy with 
respect to these industries. Two examples should serve to illustrate. 
As early as 1962 Paul MacAvoy predicted that the FPC's policy 
toward natural gas field prices (a policy that admittedly was virtually 
forced upon it by the Supreme Court) would lead in time to the 
necessity of administered rationing of gas.2 The Court and the 
Commission, he argued, had seriously misread the nature of the 
market, and prices were being set so low that exploration would be 
discouraged, so low in fact that price could not even perform its 
traditional automatic rationing function. MacAvoy may now be 
accorded the small consolation of an I-told-you-so.3 
Similarly, the regulatory process must share some measure of the 
blame for the electric power crisis in New York. Various efforts by 
the supplier both to reduce air pollution in the City and to expand 
its generating capacity have met such regulatory obstacles that the 
company is still a major polluter and now has inadequate capacity. 
The company's attempt to reduce pollution by firing its boilers with 
natural gas was blocked by the FPC and the Supreme Court.4 Its 
more recent effort to expand its peak load capacity with a pump 
storage facility is still before the courts after what can only be re• 
garded as an incredibly tortuous series of proceedings.6 This is not 
to say that the company should necessarily have prevailed in these 
cases but rather that the regulatory process was incapable of arriv-
ing at a timely policy which balanced the power needs of the City 
against the known and probable environmental costs of meeting 
those needs. 
These concerns with both the regulatory process and the regu-
2. See P. MAcAvoY, PRICE FORMATION IN NATURAL GAS FIELDS (1962), the conclusions 
of which are printed in THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 152-68 [herein• 
after CRISIS]. See also Kitch, Regulation of the Field Market for Natural Gas by the 
Federal Power Commission, 11 J. LAw &: EcoN. 243 (1968), excerpted in CRISIS, supra 
at 169-86. 
3. MacAvoy, The Regulation-Induced Shortage of Natural Gas, 14 J. LAW &: ECON, 
167, 171 (1971). 
4. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 21 F.P.C. 138 (1959), afjd., 365 U.S. 1 
(1961). The Court upheld the Commission's determination that the use of gas to fire 
boilers was an "inferior use" of a "wasting resource" when compared to domestic uses 
of gas. 365 U.S. at 8 &: n.5, 22. 
5. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). Upon remand the Commission, after some five years 
of proceedings, once more voted to grant Consolidated Edison the license. UnL. L. 
REF. ,i 11,152 (Aug. 28, 1970). The case is now before the Second Circuit for a second 
appeal, Docket Nos. 35676, 35677, 35678, 35683, 35688, 35689, 2d Cir., 1971. 
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lated industries have produced a modest revival of interest among 
economists in the problems of the regulated sector of the economy.6 
It is a revival which so far lacks a Billy Sunday, but the regulated 
industries themselves and some of the foundations have stimulated 
it by sponsoring a considerable amount of economic research in the 
field. Industry and, strikingly, even the regulatory commissions have 
come to employ both consulting and full-time economists.7 The 
academic product of this revival is well represented by the major 
treatise and three collections of economic essays on regulation which 
are listed above. 
The field which these economists are re-entering is one that, 
despite the obviously economic nature of its substance, has been con-
trolled at the practical level almost entirely by lawyers.8 True, econo-
mists have occasionally served as expert witnesses in major proceed-
ings and have one specialized academic journal devoted in large part 
to regulatory matters,9 but lawyers dominate the regulatory decision-
making process. Industry lawyers prepare the company's case; com-
mission lawyers prepare the Government's. A lawyer in the role of 
hearing examiner hears and sifts the evidence and renders an initial 
decision, which is reviewed by the commissioners, most of whom are 
lawyers.10 Appeals to the courts are, of course, entirely in lawyers' 
hands. 
The new presence of economists calls for a reappraisal of the 
role of the lawyer in the regulated industries field. The appearance 
of a new guru puts the old in an awkward position. Should he grace-
6. While regulation has always been a specialized subfield of economics, the recent 
work has been more in the mainstream than any time since the critical period of 
railroad regulation at the tum of the century. For some of the recent literature, see, 
e.g., the select bibliography in CRISIS, supra note 2, at 211-12; UTILITY REGULATION: 
NEW DIRECfIONS IN THEORY AND POLICY 264-78 [hereinafter DIRECTIONS] and authorities 
cited therein; and the select bibliography in 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULA· 
TION 201·03; 2 A. KAHN, supra, at 331-36. See also Rosoff, Economics and Regulation, 
in ABA PUBLIC UTILITY LAw SECTION, 1971 REPORT, at 31-46, and authorities cited 
therein. Rosoff's piece came into my hands too late to have any substantial impact on 
the text of this review. It contains an examination by an economist working for a 
regulated company of some of the same economic developments discussed here. Rosoff's 
conclusions on what the role of economists and economics in regulatory proceedings 
should be are, in my view, far too modest in the light of the evidence which he 
himself brings to bear. 
7. Some examples include a substantial Ford Foundation grant to the Brookings 
Institution for research in regulation; the publication of a scholarly journal on regu-
latory problems, BELL J. EcoN. &: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, funded by the American 
Telephone &: Telegraph Company, which has also funded numerous university con-
ferences and seminars on the topic; and the establishment in 1962 of an Office of 
Economics in the FPC after twenty-seven years of operation without one. 
8. See Massei, The Regulatory Process and Public Utility Performance, in PER-
FORMANCE UNDER REGULATION 113 [hereinafter PERFORMANCE]. 
9. LAND ECON, 
10. See SUBCOMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS OF THE COMM. ON GOVERN-
MENT OPERATIONS, STATE UTILITY COMMISSIONS, s. Doc. No. 56, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 
(1967); M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 106 (1955). 
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fully retire to contemplate his navel? Should he go out to do battle 
with the new? Or should he seek some kind of accommodation? And 
if so, what kind? My thesis is that the lawyers who have dominated 
the regulatory field must bear the brunt of the blame for the current 
regulatory crisis, that the business of the regulatory commissions is 
principally economic, not legal, and that professional economists 
should play a far greater role in the process than they do now. 
To test this thesis I begin by examining the causes of the crisis 
as expounded in the current economic literature. This examination 
has led me to the conclusion that regulatory practice and policy has 
suffered from not being sufficiently economic in its orientation. If 
this point is correct, there remains an important subsidiary ques• 
tion: "What role, if any, should be played by the lawyer? 
II. WHAT ARE THE ECONOMISTS SAYING? 
A. The Need for Regulation 
Price and entry regulation is the product of an era in which 
economists pretended that actual market structures could be analyzed 
as of two forms-competition or monopoly. The former model has 
the happy property that under it the economy will achieve an 
optimal allocation of resources, a condition in which all resources 
· flow to where they are most wanted and all transactions which 
benefit both participants have taken place.11 Under monopoly, in 
sharp contrast, an optimal resource allocation will not be achieved: 
Prices will be too high; production will be too small; and monopo-
lists will earn profits that serve no economic function. 
At the time the regulatory commissions were chartered, the legis-
latures made the fundamental policy choice-a choice which re-
mains unchanged to this day-to achieve or approximate the price 
and output results that would emerge from the competitive system. 
The principal device chosen to achieve this goal was not regulation 
but the antitrust laws, which have as their purpose the restoration to 
a competitive state of those sectors of the economy which were 
monopolized and the preservation of that state once it is achieved. 
Certain industries, however, cannot achieve optimal resource allo-
cation and be competitive at the same time. They display "natural 
monopoly" characteristics, declining unit costs over the relevant 
range of demand. Price and entry regulation was instituted in these 
industries to substitute for the market and to achieve as closely as 
possible the allocational advantages of competition. Roughly, entry 
regulation is designed to promote the efficiencies inherent in the 
natural monopoly characteristics of these industries, while price 
11. This condition is frequently called "Pareto-optimality" or "Pareto-efficiency." 
For a fuller description, see R, LIPSEY &: P. STEINER, EcoNollncs 344-60 (2d ed. 1969). 
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regulation attempts to establish administratively a competitively 
low price and thus prevent the inefficiencies attendant upon arti-
ficially restricted outputs.12 
This theoretical base is simple enough for most lawyers to under-
stand. An entry proceeding becomes one in which the burden is 
against a new entrant who might dissipate the efficiencies achievable 
by the monopolist. A pricing proceeding is one in which the costs of 
a given firm are determined from a combination of accounting, 
engineering and economic data, and prices set to equal those costs. 
Both proceedings require a balanced judgment about facts derived 
from a number of disciplines-the kind of judgment which trial 
judges have made with some success in many legal areas. 
This legal framework, however, is dependent on the bifurcation 
of the economic world into the simple models of competition and 
monopoly. The less sure we are that these models are the relevant 
analytic representations of reality, the more difficulties there are with 
proceeding in this simplified fashion. Over the past forty years 
economists have increasingly found these models inadequate. James 
Nelson summarizes the consensus among modern economists: "This 
simple dichotomy [between competition and monopoly] has been 
replaced by a whole family of theoretical market categories, blur-
ring along the edges."13 In the regulated sector especially, economic 
developments have been making it increasingly difficult to see the 
outlines of the classical monopoly model. For example, the threat 
of technological obsolescence, a fate which seems to have overtaken 
both intercity passenger rail transport and public message telegraph, 
may provide incentives to innovate that, at least in part, substitute 
for those provided by competition in the classical competitive mo-
del.14 Further, many regulated industries are now confronting 
considerably more direct competition than they were in the past. 
The transportation industry strikingly illustrates this latter phe-
12. For an exposition of the basic theory, see I A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 1-19; 
Lerner, Conflicting Prindples of Public Utility Price Regulation, 7 J. LAW & EcoN. 
61 (1964), in CRISIS, supra note 2, at 18-29, as Conflicting Prindples of Public Utility 
Rate Regulation. Of course, as Lerner points out, absent perfect price discrimination, 
Pareto-optimality cannot be achieved in a declining cost industry so long as some or 
all of the consumers must bear the imbedded costs of the service. For some provocative 
suggestions on how to approach this problem, see Baumol, Reasonable Rules for Rate 
Regulation: Plausible Policies for an Imperfect World, in PRICES: ISSUES IN THEORY, 
PRAcnCE AND PUBLIC POLICY (A. Phillips & o. Williamson ed. 1967), and in CRISIS, supra 
note 2, at 187-206. See generally J. NELSON, MARGINAL COST PRICING IN PRACTICE (1964). 
13. Nelson, Pricing and Resource Allocation: The Public Utility Sector, in DIREC-
TIONS, supra note 6, at 59, 84-85. 
14. See Adams & Dirlam, Market Structure, Regulation and Dynamic Change, in 
PERFORMANCE, supra note 8, at 131. Scherer notes that" ••• an output handicap amount-
ing to 10 per cent of gross national product due to static inefficiency is surmounted 
in just five years if the rate of growth of output can be raised through more rapid 
technological change from 3 to 5 per cent per annum •••• " F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL 
l\fARKET STRUCTURE &: ECON0!IIlC PERFORMANCE 346 (1970). 
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nomenon and so, many would argue, does the energy industry, par-
ticularly if gas and electric companies are kept separate.1u 
These developments raise the question whether regulation today 
actually has any effect at all. One study of this question by George 
Stigler and Claire Friedland has had such a significant impact in the 
economic world that it has been reprinted in two of the recent 
collections of economic essays about regulation.16 Using fairly sophis-
ticated econometric techniques, Stigler and Friedland compared both 
the revenue and output of various regulated and unregulated elec-
tric companies during the teens, twenties, and thirties of this cen-
tury. They concluded that once inherent cost differences were 
controlled for, regulation had little or no "significant" effect on 
either the revenue or the output of the companies. The authors sug-
gest that the reason for this result is that there was sufficient compe-
tition in the energy industry to keep the performance of the 
unregulated companies close to competitive without regulation and 
that regulation was sufficiently imprecise to make any significant 
difference. 
The Stigler-Friedland thesis has been subjected to considerable 
scrutiny, and a number of objections have been raised.17 These ob-
jections, however, need not detain us here, for despite them, the 
Stigler-Friedland position has remained "relatively secure."18 Fur-
ther, no serious scholar doubts that the question whether regula-
tion has any effect is a fundamental and serious one, and that however 
difficult their techniques and debatable their conclusions, Stigler and 
Friedland offer a methodology for answering this type of question 
which has great promise for fruitful results. Yet, with a few excep-
tions, the lawyers who dominate the regulatory process have not 
come to grips with the challenge which they present. 
At first glance, such studies seem to have little relevance to prac-
ticing lawyers except perhaps in their occasional role as legislators. 
After all, the commissions are there and will continue to be there 
15. See Adams &: Dirlam, supra note 14. 
16. What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J. LAW &: ECON. 1 
(1962), in CRISIS, supra note 2, at 39-52, and in DIRECTIONS, supra note 6, at 187-211, 
17. For example, if the criteria concerning what constitutes "significant" effect are 
relaxed somewhat, the data will bear the inference that regulation has some effect. Sec 
F. SCHERER, supra note 14, at 537 n.40; Comanor, Should Natural Monopolies IJe Regu-
lated?, 22 STAN. L. REv. 510, 515-17 (1970). On a broader scale, the Stigler-Friedland 
analysis can be criticised because it does not take into account the difference between 
active and inactive commissions, nor the threat of regulation in an unregulated juris-
diction. Such intangibles are difficult to measure, but they open the policy conclusions 
of the piece to question. Further, even if the analysis is correct, any inference as to the 
effect of regulation today requires the further assumption that conditions since the 
Second World War are the same as those prior to the War. Stigler and Friedland, 
of course, could not make the same kind of comparison with recent data, since in 
recent years practically every company in the electric industry has been regulated. 
18. CRISIS, supra note 2, at 39. 
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until the legislature disestablishes them. This view, however, is 
short-sighted. If there is something to the notion that regulatory 
commissions need not do some or a large portion of their job be-
cause competition is doing it for them in a better and more precise 
fashion, then it is incumbent upon the lawyers who practice before 
the commissions to make the commissions aware of this fact and upon 
the la'wyers who run the commissions to act accordingly. The law, by 
and large, does not prescribe how the commissions are to exercise 
their jurisdiction.19 There may be many instances in which better 
results would be produced if the commissions engaged in what we 
might call administrative self-denial20 by allowing market forces to 
dictate their decisions about the industries under their jurisdiction. 
The FCC's recent opening of the private microwave field to greater 
competition is a step in this direction.21. 
But are la'wyers particularly competent to decide whether to 
open portions of the regulated area to more entrants or to allow 
market forces to determine certain regulated prices? Such decisions 
require empirical judgments about which of a number of competing 
economic models is most relevant to the question at hand. These 
judgments, in turn, often, if not always, benefit from the use of the 
kind of econometric analysis employed in the Stigler-Friedland study. 
The analysis is considerably more complicated than the kind of 
descriptive statistics which lawyers have traditionally manipulated 
in the "Brandeis brief." It is not, to my knowledge, taught at any law 
school, and is sufficiently complicated that a lawyer is unlikely to be 
able to master it in his spare time. On the other hand, econometrics 
is an integral part of the training of most modern economists. This 
training is designed to teach not only how to manipulate the for-
mulae which go into the analysis, but how to judge the results-
whether the range of error is too large for comfort and whether the 
correlations indicate direct causal relationships or simply indicate 
deeper causes. 
B. The Techniques of Regulation 
Recent economic literature has done more than raise questions 
about the justification of regulation. It has- delved quite deeply into 
the problems of over-all profit regulation and pricing of individual 
19. For example, the statutory standards governing prices ("All charges ••• shall 
be just and reasonable," 47 U.S.C. § 20I(b) (1964)) and entry ("The !FCC] shall have 
power to issue such certificate ••. as in its judgment the public convenie_nce may require," 
47 U.S.C. § 214(c) (1964)) in the communications field are so vague ·that regulation 
might just as well be left to market forces, · : · 
20. The phrase is mine; the idea is developed in Posner, Natural Monopoly and its_ 
Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548, 640-43 (1969). . 
21. See 2 A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 132-36, 149-52; 37 TELEcor.WUNICATIONS Rn>., 
June 1, 1971, at I; · · 
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services. As to over-all profit regulation, the regulated firm tradition-
ally is allowed to set its rates so that they will yield revenues equal to 
the firm's operating expenses plus depreciation plus a "fair" profit. 
This "fair" profit is usually calculated by multiplying a rate of 
return times a rate base, which base represents the capital which 
the firm has "dedicated to the public service."22 0£ all the items in 
this formula none has occupied more time in the courts and com-
missions than the calculation of the proper rate of return. The 
reason for the difficulty is that there is a vaguely defined constitu-
tional minimum below which a court may find the rate "confisca-
tory."23 Above the minimum the commissions have a great deal of 
latitude, but this latitude is always tempered by the regulated firm's 
argument that placing the rate too low, even if above the confiscatory 
level, will mean that the company will not be able to attract capital 
on the open market and service will decline. 
The presence of the legal minimum and fears about service de-
cline motivate a commission to set the rate of return on the high 
side. Two economists, Harvey Averch and Leland Johnson, on the 
other hand, have demonstrated rigorously that a profit-maximizing 
firm which receives a greater return on its capital than the cost of 
that capital will be motivated to maximize investment in a number of 
socially inefficient ways.24 It will, for example, employ capital to do 
jobs which could be done by labor at less real cost; it will expand 
into new lines of business even though these lines return less than 
their marginal cost. 
The furor that the Averch-Johnson thesis has caused is some-
what surprising.25 Observers of the regulatory scene have long noticed 
that regulated companies have a tendency to "pad the rate base" be-
cause they can earn a return only on capital invested in that rate 
base.26 Pipeline companies want to build their own pipelines, not 
22. Symbolically we may represent this formula as: 
where: 
RR= OE+ D + %R(OC-D) 
RR = total revenue (revenue requirements); 
OE = the sum of legitimate operating expenses; 
D = accounting depreciation on capital equipment (usually calculated by 
straight-line methods); 
%R = the percentage rate of return; and 
OC - D = the rate base (here to be calculated by the more usual method of 
subtracting accrued depreciation from the original accounting cost 
of the capital plant and equipment). 
Clearly, an accountant's nightmare lurks in this formula. Most regulatory commis• 
sions have adopted standardized accounting procedures, but the debates over particular 
items are many and furious. See, e.g., 1 A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 25-35. 
23. See P. GARFIELD & w. LoVEJOY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 117-18 (1964). 
24. Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. 
EcoN, REv. 1052 (1962). See Wellisz, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipeline Companies: An 
Economic Analysis, 71 J. PoL. ECON. 30, 39 (1963). 
25. See Rosoff, supra note 6, at 34-36, for a review of the literature. 
26. Rate base padding is not necessarily a manifestation of the Avcrch-Johnson 
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lease space in someone else's.27 Many electric utilities, without sus-
picion or complaint, paid highly inflated prices for generators during 
the years of the electric equipment conspiracy.28 The battle over 
who is to own satellite earth stations can best be understood in these 
terms.29 
If the purpose of price and entry regulation is to achieve the 
allocative effects of a competitive market,30 then the rate of return 
problem fits quite neatly into place. Capital is a resource and, like 
all other resources, it has a cost. The commissions have the task, in 
the absence of a market, of determining this cost. They have always 
been at least dimly aware of the misallocative effects of estimating 
that cost too low; Averch and Johnson have simply pointed out the 
misallocative effects of estimating it too high. 
Granted the importance of precision in this area,31 one can only 
be disturbed at the way the calculation of the cost of capital is cur-
rently made. The cost of capital is said to be a matter of judgment;32 
in practice this means that its computation is a kind of guessing game 
in which a jumble of numbers, including the returns allowed by 
other commissions and those earned in vastly different industries, 
are thrown before the commission, which then pulls a compromise 
figure out of its hat. On the other hand, the economists who specialize 
in financial matters have provided working models for such calcula-
tions that require the exercise of sophisticated statistical judgment 
but have a far firmer grounding in empirical reality than most of 
the methods currently used in regulatory proceedings.33 These 
effect. It may be simply tricky accounting, or it may be a manifestation of the phenom-
enon that "not high profits but a quiet life is the chief reward of monopoly power" 
(United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 347 (D. Mass. 1953), 
afjd., 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (Wyzanski, J.)), i.e., taking advantage of a monopoly pasition 
to be less vigilant about costs. In this latter respect, however, there is no moi:e incentive 
to pad the rate base than there is to pad the operating accounts. 
27. See Wellisz, supra note 24, at 35-36. 
28. See Westfield, Regulation and Conspirac·y, 55 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. 424 (1965). 
29. See, e.g., 36 TELECOMMUNICATIONS REP., Aug. 17, 1970, at 2; 36 id., Aug. 3, 1970. 
at I. 
30. See text accompanying note 12 supra. 
31. One recent analysis of the Averch-Johnson thesis shows that under certain 
cost conditions the distortive effect is greater the closer the commission sets the rate 
of return to the true cost of capital, so long as the return set is not exactly correct. 
F. SCHERER, supra note 14, at 533, 551-55. For the sake of the commissions I can only 
hope that Scherer's assumptions about the shape of the cost function are incorrect. 
32. See, e.g., 1 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 215-16 (1969), 
and authorities cited therein. 
33. See, e.g., Miller 8: Modigliani, Some Estimates of the Cost of Capital to the 
Electric Utility Industry, 56 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. 333 (1966); Robichek, McDonald 8: Hig• 
gins, Some Estimates of the Cost of Capital to the Electric Utility Industry, 1954-57: 
Comment, 57 AM ECON. R.Ev. 1278 (1967); Robichek 8: Myers, Valuation of the Firm: 
Effects of Uncertainty in a Market Context, 21 J. FINANCE 215 (1966); Solomon 8: Laya, 
Measuring Comf1a11y Profitability: Some Systematic Errors in the Accounting Rate of 
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models are based on the premise that the investor is not buying 
a piece of equipment when he buys stock in a company, but that 
he is buying a stream of benefits, some combination of dividends 
and growth anticipated over a period of years, discounted to present 
value and adjusted for risk, inflation, etc. Thus, the traditional rate 
base calculated on the basis of the book value of capital equipment, 
or on the basis of the reproduction cost of that equipment, is an 
arbitrary place to begin calculating the investor's expected return 
and hence the company's cost of capital. 
A discounted fl.ow-of-benefits method of calculating the cost of 
capital has been presented in at least one major commission proceed-
ing.34 The Commission's opinion solidly summarized the testimony 
concerning the model both pro and con, described it as a "new and 
challenging approach" with "promise of being a useful tool,''35 and 
rejected its application with the following language: 
We have not had the opportunity to analyze, evaluate, and test 
fully his model to determine all of its implications in so far as 
fixing an overall rate of return is concerned. However, we believe 
that it merits further attention as a means of making available 
more objective data and substantive support for the exercise of the 
subjective judgments in fixing a rate of return. We would, there-
fore, encourage further study and refinement of the model to make it 
more useful in resolving the special problems which arise in the field 
of regulated entities.36 
Without in any way disparaging the Commission's efforts, its reac-
tion was predictable, granted the training of the bulk of its members 
and staff. Unless the Commission went through a retraining process 
or turned over the decision-making function entirely to its experts, 
it is hard to see how such an analysis would ever be "useful" to it.31 
In the pricing of individual services, the same pattern prevails as 
Return, in FINANCIAL RE.sEARCH AND MANAGEMENT DECISIONS 152 (A. Robichek ed. 
1967). See also I A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 42-57. 
34. In re American Tel. & Tel. Co., 9 F.C.C.2d 30, 70 P.U.R.3d 129 (1967). 
35. 9 F.C.C.2d at 66-68, 70 P.U.R.3d at 173-76. 
36. 9 F.C.C.2d at 87, 70 P.U.R.3d at 195. See Nelson, Econometrics and Applied 
Economic Analysis in Regulatory Decisions, 34 L. & CoNTEMP. PROD. 330, 333.34 (1969), 
37~ For the sad story of other such efforts, see Rosoff, supra note 6, at 39•43. Typical 
of the judicial reaction is the following from the Tenth Circuit: 
From the information so obtained the parties, the staff, and the Commission may 
make many computations and reach many results. The assumptions, allocations, 
formulae, equations, averages, means, and massive calculations may intrigue a 
mathematician or statistician but they have no attraction for us. We respectfully, 
decline to be drawn into such a turmoil of numbers .••• We leave to the ex• 
perts the selection of source material and the calculations to be made therefrom, 
Our concern is with the result. -
Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC, 375 F.2d 6, 24 (10th Cir. 1967). How the court was to evaluate 
the result without understanding the process through which it was achieved is never 
made clear. · 
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in the setting of over-all revenues: economics has made •significant 
contributions in theory, factual analysis, and practical policy sug-
gestions, but the commissions have largely ignored these contribu-
tions.88 Two interconnected problems predominate here-pricing 
services which contribute to the firm's peak load and pricing services 
which, because of the weakness of demand for them or the ease of 
substitution of competing services, cannot be sold at a price equal 
to average total cost. One example of each problem should suffice. 
In the Atlantic Seaboard case,39 the FPC decided that off-peak 
customers of a gas pipeline should bear twenty-five per cent of the 
cost of the capacity of the pipe on the rationale that no one should 
get a free ride on the line. The principle of the decision is economi-
cally unimpeachable if it is restated: absent compelling social reasons 
to the contrary, no user should pay the costs for another's service. 
But what are the costs of taking a passenger to Chicago if the train 
is going there anyway, and if that passenger can b_e bumped off in 
Dubuque should enough full-fare passengers come on . to fill the 
train? Arguing that this was the situation in the Atlantic Seabord 
case, many economists have charged that the rule of the decision 
resulted in the loss of off-peak business to the pipelines and thus in 
higher prices for the remaining users.40 
A careful reading of the Seaboard opinion, however, reveals that 
the Commission was struggling with a more complex problem than 
that of the train through Dubuque. The Seaboard case was a certifi-
cation (entry) case; the question at issue was not how to fill the pipe 
once it is built, but rather whether to build it at all, and, if so, how 
large to build it. There is some indication that an off-peak -price 
which did not contribute to capacity costs would have stimulated 
demand sufficiently to exceed the capacity of the pipe. If this is so, the 
Commission was dealing not with the relatively simple "firm peak" 
problem presented by the train through Dubuque but with the theo-
retically much more difficult "shifting peak" problem, a problem that 
despite its analytic difficulty does have a logical solution.41 Lacking 
the economic sophistication to perceive the nature of the problem., the. 
Commission and the fawyers involved in the decision ended up with 
a rigid rule-of-thumb,-~vhich possibly ha~ serious misallocative effects. 
38. Indeed, the commissions frequently ignore the pricing of individual services 
entirely, leaving the job to utility management. See 1 A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 54-57; 
Troxel, Telephone Regulation in Michigan, in DIREcnoNs, supra note 6, at 141, 
175•85. . I 
39. In re Atlantic Seaboard Corp., 11 F.P.C. 43, 94 P.U.R. 235 (1952) .. 
40. See P. GARFIELD&: W. LOVEJOY, supra note 23, at 184-85; Herz, Impact of Cost 
Allocation on Gas Pricing, 58 PUB. Ura.. FoRT . .-685" (1956); Nisse!, The Impact of Cost 
Allocations upon Future of the Natural Gas Indus'try, 66 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 512 (1-960)., 
41. See Steiner, Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing, 71 Q.J. ECON. 585 (1957). For a 
review of the subsequent literature, see Steiner, Peak Load Pricing Revisited (mimeo 
ed.) (to be published in MSU Punuc UTILITY STUDIES (Trebing ed. 1971)). 
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The ICC's minimum price regulation of bulk commodity rail rates 
in cases where alternative water routes exist illustrates the problem 
of pricing competing services and its relationship to the peak load 
problem. In a situation in which pricing the rail service at less than 
fully allocated but not more than "out-of-pocket" (or marginal)42 
cost would result in the barge lines losing business, the ICC forbade 
the rail carrier from undercutting the barge prices.43 Its justification 
was that the barges would go out of business, whereupon the rail-
roads would raise prices again, and thus the other users of the rail-
road would be subsidizing this "destructive competition." The 
argument will not withstand careful analysis. It ignores the ex-
treme unlikelihood that granted today's discount rates and the ease 
of entry into and exit from the barge business, destructive compe-
tition could be profitable. It also ignores the fact that under con-
ditions of declining unit cost any contribution to the fixed cost 
of a service made by a customer who has an alternative source of 
supply benefits the customer who does not have that source. 
The problem of the pricing of individual services in the trans-
portation industry has been subject to a considerable amount of 
quantitative analysis. On the basis of an extensive examination of the 
costs of various modes of surface transportation, one informed econo-
mist estimates the cost to the economy of the misallocations resulting 
from decisions like the ICC's rail-barge case at several billion dollars 
annually.44 Another, examining the trucking industry alone, esti-
mates an annual loss of from 375 to 500 million dollars through mis-
allocations resulting from artificially high common carrier truck 
rates.45 While the other regulated industries have not been subjected 
to as much similar scrutiny,40 there is no reason why they could not 
be. Again, as in the other areas we have examined, there are difficul-
ties with obtaining the proper data, but as one economist has 
trenchantly put it: 
42. Marginal costs are the economically relevant ones, but "out-of-pocket" costs arc 
as close as the ICC can come to calculating them. See Wilson, TIie Effect of Rate Regu• 
lation on Resource Allocation in Transportation, 54 AM. EcoN, REv. 160, 161-63 &: 
n.2 (Papers&: Proceedings) (1964), in CRISIS, supra note 2, at 57, 58-61 &: n.2. 
43. Ingot Molds, Pa. to Steelton, Ky., 326 I.C.C. 77 (1965), revd. sub 110,n, Louisville 
&: N.R.R._v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 71 (W.D. Ky. 1967), reud. sub 110,n, American 
Commerci;il, Lines, Inc. v Louisville &: N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571 (1968), noted in 81 HARV, L. 
REv. 905 (1968), criticized in 1 A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 160-66. See Rose, Regulation 
of ltitermodel Rate Competition in Transportation, 69 MICH, L. REv. 1011 (1971). 
44. Peck, Competitive Policy for Transportation, in CRISIS, supra note 2, at 72, N, 
based on J. MEYER, M. PECK, J. STENASON &: C. ZWICK, THE ECONOMICS OF COMPE• 
TITION IN THE TRANSPORTAnoN INDUSTRY (1959). 
45. W, Oi &: A. HURTER, ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE TRUCK TRANSPORTATION ll5!1 (1965), 
See M. BURNSTEIN, et al., THE COST OF TRUCKING: ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (1965). 
46. But cf. Littlecbild, Peak-load Pricing of Telephone Calls, l BELL J. EcoN, &: 
MANAGEMENT ScIENCE 191 (1970). 
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The fact that the elasticity of demand is difficult to estimate does 
not make it more sensible to assume that demand has no elasticity 
at all. The anxiety to avoid burdening certain customers by charging 
others less than fully distributed costs does not justify burdening 
them even more by refusing a utility permission to reach out for 
additional business, when a discriminatory rate is necessary to get it 
and where it seems reasonably probable that it will cover its full 
additional costs. The fact that off-peak consumption at certain times 
of the day or year is close enough to the peak to make it reasonably 
probable that the peak might shift is no excuse for forcing customers 
also to bear capacity costs at times that are unlikely to become peaks. 
The fact that future costs are difficult to estimate does not make it 
rational to cling to past costs, when there is clear reason to believe 
they are ·wrong. The use of correct principles is still far from solving 
all the problems of intelligent public utility pricing; but it is the 
correct place to begin.47 
Economic thinking in the regulated industry area has not con-
fined itself to the problems discussed above. Serious efforts have 
been made, for example, to measure the performance of various 
firms within an industry.48 These studies have, to my knowedge, 
been ignored in regulatory practice. Since the evaluation of the per-
formance of a regulated company is one of the most troublesome of 
regulatory problems, one can only speculate that the techniques used 
in these studies simply could not be comprehended by the regulators. 
Similarly, the Office of Economics of the FPC attempted to construct 
a model of natural gas needs and the relationship of these needs to 
price.49 While there were analytic problems with this model, had the 
Commission refined and used it, the natural gas crisis of today 
might have been avoided. 
The picture I have painted above is clearer than reality. Econo-
mists are by no means unanimous in their prescriptions for the regu-
lated industries. Nonetheless, the basic views of economists of a wide 
range of political persuasion are as I have outlined: Regulation, in 
many instances, is unnecessary and, as currently practiced, is inept; 
the regulatory "crisis," in large measure, is a product of these 
characteristics. 60 
47. I A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 199. 
48. See, e.g., w. IULO, ELECTRIC UTILmES-Cosrs AND PERFORMANCE (1961); J. Pace, 
Relative Efficiency in the Electric Utility Industry, 1970 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation 
in University of Michigan Graduate Library). See generally PERFORMANCE, supra note 8. 
49. See Rosoff, supra note 6, at 41-43. 
50. MacAvoy, after rehearsing the findings of economic research which "lead to 
the very general conclusion that regulation has imposed considerable costs on public 
utility company operations without providing compensating benefits," puts it this 
way: "[I'Jhe crisis is not in regulation, but rather of the need for regulation as it now 
exists, in comparison with totally new techniques or no regulation at all." CrusIS, supra 
note 2, at viii (emphasis original), 
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III. MEANWHILE, BACK AT THE BAR 
My thesis, as I intimated. earlier, is that these criticisms should 
lead us to re-evaluate the role of lawyers in the regulatory field. The 
very fact that there is a crisis in the field, caused, so far as we can 
tell, by regulation, means that the professional group responsible for 
regulation should be called to account. Our review of what the econo-
mists are saying has indicated a number of situations in which the 
regulators have ignored economic contributions because of their 
seeming inability to understand them. This is disturbing. The regu-
lators should at least be able to understand the advice being offered 
by a group which has devoted considerable attention to the resolu-
tion of the problems which have caused the crisis. My thesis, however, 
goes beyond the proposition that lawyers should abandon regulation 
because they do not understand economics. My thesis is that lawyers 
are peculiarly unsuited to making the types of decisions which are at 
stake in price and entry regulation. 
Since this proposition may seem startling to many-particularly 
to the practitioners in the regulated industry field-it calls for 
some initial clarification. While the substance of law and economics 
may overlap, they remain, and are likely to remain for the near 
future, two separate disciplines. In a world in which training had 
no costs, we would recommend that the regulatory process be in the 
hands of persons who had complete professional training in both 
fields. But despite the recent availability of various joint degree pro-
grams,61 persons trained in both law and economics remain rare even 
in the academic world. Granted the necessity of choosing between 
legally and economically trained regulators, economics training is a 
better preparation, in my view, for a career in regulation than is 
legal training. This does not mean that all economists would make 
better regulatory decisions than all lawyers. There are many 
economic considerations which a good lawyer will see and a bad 
economist will not. But lawyers, however much they may like to 
think so, do not have a monopoly on brains.62 Given an equally bright 
lawyer and economist, the former will usually be a better lawyer and 
the latter a better economist. 
Granted these qualifications, two characteristics of price and 
entry regulation lead to the conclusion that the job would be better 
done by those with economic rather than legal training, The first 
is the econometric nature of the information needed to make proper 
regulatory decisions. Not coincidentally ea.ch .of the economic criti-
· 51. Programs combining law and economic training are available at the Uni-
versities of Michigan and Chicago and at ·Northw"estern University, to name but a 
few known to the author. 
52. See P. COMESTOR, DE CRANIIS ADVOCATORUM ET PHILOSOPHORUM SOCIALIUI\I (1516), 
for the first recorded instance of this observation. 
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cisms of the regulatory process which we examined above leads to a 
body of econometric research which offers a method for arriving at a 
more satisfactory answer to the problem. Not all of this research is 
of a uniformly high quality, and most of it needs substantial refine-
ment. But these problems do not change the conclusion that refined 
econometric data will give us, in time, better regulatory decisions. 
That these data have not, by and large, been forthcoming is not 
only the product of the ignorance of the lawyers who control the ad-
ministrative process; it is also a product of the legal nature of the 
process itself. Adversary proceedings are not conducive to the dis-
covery of scientific data. Discovery to the lawyer is the ferreting out 
of human facts concealed beneath the surface of the proceeding-
finding out what the parties really did or what they really intended. 
Discovery in the econometric world, on the other hand, consists in 
trying to unravel something which no human yet knows. The ad-
versary process has proved highly successful for the former type of 
discovery, not nearly so for the latter.53 
Suppose, however, that we trained a new breed of lawyers who 
could deal with econometric data. Suppose, too, that the regulatory 
agencies could engage in a substantial research program which would 
produce the needed data, and that administrative procedure could 
be reformed in such a way that these data could be placed before the 
commission in an acceptable form. Even under these assumptions, 
the current domination by lawyers of regulatory proceedings is un-
justified because of the second peculiar characteristic of price and 
entry regulation. Earlier I asserted that the sole function of price and 
entry regulation is to compensate for market failure-to perform the 
allocative function of the competitive market in a situation in which 
that market could not operate. 54 If this assertion is correct, it means 
that the only goal of regulation is the optimal allocation of resources. 
This goal differs from that of most legal endeavors. Here only a 
single value is at stake, while many if not most legal endeavors in-
volve a trade-off between or among several values. It means, too, 
that the goal of regulation is purely economic. This fact, coupled 
with the econometric nature of the information necessary to achieve 
this goal, makes a powerful argument for the proposition that the 
economist not the lawyer should be the chief participant in regula-
tory decisions. To the extent, however, that regulation is seeking 
53. In the interests of space I cannot explore the implications of this statement for 
administrative procedure. See pt. III. B. infra; Gies, The Need· for New Concepts in 
Public Utility Regulation, in DIRECTIONS, supra note 6, at 88, 107-11; Nelson, supra 
note 36, at 337-38. For a fascinating study of the use and misuse of mathematical proof 
in traditional trial proceedings, see Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual 
in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329, 1332-'78 (1971). See also Lozowick, Steiner 
&: Miller, Law and Quantitative Multivariate Analysis: An Encounter, 66 MICH. L. REv. 
1641 (1968). 
54. See text accompanying note 12 supra, 
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noneconomic goals in addition to economic 6nes or even to the 
extent that it is seeking a number of inconsistent economic goals, the 
argument for legal control is strengthened, since lawyers have tradi-
tionally participated in public decisions which require the applica-
tion of a number of disciplines or the analysis of the trade-offs among 
goals. 
A. The Univocal Goal of Regulation 
The proposition that the sole goal of price and entry regulation 
is the approximation of the allocational efficiency of the competitive 
market has not been totally accepted even by economists.lili We will 
therefore examine, in turn, four possible goals of regulation other 
than allocational efficiency: (I) the historic goal of "equity,'' (2) the 
"economically irrelevant" goals of certification proceedings, (3) the 
goal of service standards proceedings, and (4) possible nonallocational 
economic goals. 
Certainly considerations broader than allocational efficiency were 
thought to be appropriate for price and entry regulation in the past. 
Some of the legislators who voted for the adoption of price and entry 
regulation at the time of the Granger and Populist movements looked 
to regulation not only as a means of achieving efficiency but also as 
a means of achieving equity for their constituents.li6 They hoped that 
regulation would effect a redistribution of income between the regu-
lated firm and its customers. As the years have gone by, however, the 
conscious pursuit of that goal, despite occasional protestations to 
the contrary,57 has been abandoned by regulation. More efficient in-
struments of redistributive policy, such as social insurance, progres-
sive income taxation, and welfare programs, have taken over the 
function of redistribution in our society. The occasional regulatory 
efforts in this direction are haphazard, usually misguided, and of 
insufficient scale to justify a conclusion that the goal of regulation 
today is any other than allocative efficiency.58 
The vocabulary, however, of the days in which the pursuit of 
redistributive equity was a major regulatory goal remains in regula-
tory decisions and masks-to the confusion sometimes of the regula-
tors themselves-what upon examination tum out to be economic 
considerations. Rate of return provides an example. The economist 
talks of the cost of capital; the lawyer, of the fair return. The econ-
55. See, e.g., 1 A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 182-99; Rosoff, supra note 6, at 45•46. 
56. See w. JONES, REGULATED INDUSTRIES 38-43 (1967). 
57. See, e.g., the statement of Commissioner Webb of the ICC in Wilson, supra 
note 42, at 164, in CRISIS, supra note 2, at 57, 62·63. 
58. See I A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 190-92. But see Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 
2 BELL J. EcoN. &: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 22 (1971), for an interesting, if heretical view, 
with illustrations from the communications industry. 
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omist focuses on what is needed to attract new capital to a firm. 
The lawyer sometimes talks as if the firm were in need of a reward 
because it has "dedicated its property to public use," or, in somewhat 
more sophisticated terms, he refers to a "balancing of consumer and 
investor interests." Both of the la·wyer's notions can lead to peculiar 
results. The reward notion leads to "fair value" rate base calculation 
long since abandoned as a federal constitutional requirement,59 and 
the balancing notion implies that somehow a basic weighing of 
values is involved. 
The fact is that when the misleading verbiage is cleared away 
both lawyers and economists are talking about the same thing. Much 
confusion has arisen from the failure to identify two arguably dif-
ferent perspectives: the cost of new capital to the firm, what we might 
call the incremental cost of capital; and that return ~which is neces-
sary to keep the investor who already holds stock in the firm from 
selling it. The two are, of course, connected. In the short run it 
makes no difference to the firm if the investors sell or not. The firm 
has the capital, and the investor will bear any loss. But since the 
treatment of the old investor will affect the new, the return to exist-
ing investors makes a great deal of difference in the long run if the 
firm intends to attract new capital. Emphasis on fairness to the exist-
ing investor, however, without consideration of the reason for it, 
can lead in a declining industry or deflationary economy to rates 
of return that are too high; in a growing industry or inflationary 
economy to rates that are too low.60 
Economists and economically oriented ·writers frequently charge 
that much of what the commissions do, particularly in certification 
proceedings, is "economically irrelevant."61 If the charge were true, 
the presence of such economic irrelevancies might indicate that the 
goal of the proceedings is not an economic one. Closer examination, 
however, reveals that the charge is frequently exaggerated and where 
it is true, it is not a criticism of the commissions for seeking a non-
economic goal but rather for using inappropriate means to reach 
an economic goal. 
Roger Cramton, for example, charges that much of what the 
commissions do constitutes economically irrelevant "tribal rites.''62 
He illustrates his thesis by arguing that once the CAB has decided 
59. Compare Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), with FPC v. Hope Natural Gas 
Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). 
60. See Leventhal, Vitality of the Comparable Earnings Standard for Regulation of 
Utilities in a Growth Economy, 74 YALE L.J. 989 (1965). · 
61. See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTIVITY & Co:a.rPETITION, REPORT § IB (1969), 
ins. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL A.NrITRusr LAws 207-08 (Supp. 1970) (herein-
after STIGLER TASK FORCE REPORT); Lewis, Emphasis and Misemphasis in Regulatory 
Policy, in DIRECTIONS, supra note 6, at 213, 247. 
62. Cramton, The Effectiveness of Economic Regulation-A Legal View, 54 A11r. 
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that there are to be three carriers on the Washington-to-Florida 
route, it is economically irrelevant whether the third carrier is 
Braniff or Delta. The unstated premise of his argument is that once 
the structure of an industry is determined, economic behavior and 
performance follow inevitably. Even if this premise were true, struc-
ture involves more than simply the number of firms in a given 
market. Surely the service which Braniff, as opposed to Delta, might 
provide may be dictated not only by the number of competitors in 
the market but also by the configuration of their routes-a con-
sideration which occupies a great portion of the CAB's certification 
proceedings. If Braniff has to fly empty equipment from Texas in 
order to provide service on the Washington-Florida route, it will 
need a higher volume of traffic to support that service than will 
Delta, if Delta already has equipment on line in Florida that could 
be used to provide the service. 
A more fundamental problem with Cramton's argument, how• 
ever, is his premise that there are inexorable links between economic 
structure, behavior, and performance. Links, of course, there are, 
but it is the loose linkage of a chain, not the firm linkage of a 
tie-rod. Surely it will make some difference who the managements of 
the firms are, whether they have followed an active competitive 
policy, how good their credit rating is, how good their pilots are, 
and a myriad of other factors frequently considered in certification 
proceedings. Surely, too, it will make a difference to service in other 
areas, if not to the Washington-Florida service, if the firm awarded 
the route is compelled by the CAB to use the revenues from that 
route to subsidize traffic in other areas. 
Thus, Cramton is not arguing that the goal of CAB certification 
proceedings is noneconomic, nor even that the criteria which the 
CAB applies are noneconomic. Rather, he seems to be arguing that 
the CAB should rely more on market forces to determine the struc-
ture of the airline industry-a proposition for which there is consid-
erable support in economic literature.63 Further, Cramton may also be 
arguing that the CAB had to undertake the difficult, if not impos-
sible, job of predicting which firm will provide efficiently the service 
which consumers want, because it has chosen to insulate airlines from 
the very market forces which if allowed to operate would compel 
efficient economic performance. Finally, he certainly is suggesting 
that the Commission's lack of economic expertise leads it to con-
sume vast amounts of time on individual certification proceedings 
EcoN. REv. 182 (Papers &: Proceedings) (1964), in DIRECTIONS, supra note 6, at 249, 251, 
Cramton's argument goes beyond the traditional regulated industries as we have 
defined them (see note 1 supra). His examples from broadcasting regulation are telling 
.and do not require the qualifications suggested in the text for· his CAB example, 
63. See Caves, Performance, Structure and the Goals of Civil Aeronautics Board 
Regulatio•n, in· Crus1s, supra note 2, at 131. 
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which produce little in the way of perceivable ·economic results. All 
of these contentions assume that the goal of these proceedings is 
economic and attack the manner in which that goal is being achieved. 
Most of the charges of "economic irrelevance" seem to reduce to 
one or another of the contentions I attribute to Cramton. 
There are certainly some certification proceedings, however, where 
noneconomic values seem to be at stake. In the Storm King case64 
the Second Circuit forced a reluctant FPC to consider the conserva-
tion and aesthetic aspects of granting to Consolidated Edison of New 
York a license to build a pump storage plant on Storm King Moun-
tain. Numerous state regulatory commissions have had to consider 
the propriety of compelling regulated firms to bury utility lines and 
pipes.66 Although these situations seem to involve noneconomic con-
siderations, they can be examined in economic terms. They involve 
a classic type of market failure-the social costs of the activity are 
greater than the private costs to the actor. Further, an efficient solu-
tion to the problem may be approximated through the use of a 
quantifiable model, the cost-benefit analysis.66 
Thus, economic learning has some relevance to such decisions. 
Cost is surely relevant. Since few would maintain that Storm 
King Mountain has infinite value, the cost of saving it should 
be determined. But once the economist has determined how 
much saving Storm King will cost, he is probably no better equipped 
than the lawyer to determine whether Storm King is worth these 
costs. We cannot argue, therefore, that this type of proceeding 
should necessarily be entirely in the hands of the economists. 
The service standards problem is another area in which econom-
ics, though relevant, is probably not controlling, both because the 
area presents a problem for which, to my knowledge, economic theory 
has devised no solution and because the economic data from which a 
solution might be approximated are difficult to determine. The prob-
lem is caused by the fact that many regulated industries are con-
strained by their technologies to serve all consumers from a common 
plant. This means, in many instances, that they provide only one of 
the many possible levels of service. Some consumers would indubita-
64. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). 
65. Compare In re Rules for the Undergrounding of Elec. &: Communication Serv. 
Facilities, 78 P.U.R.3d 189 (Ark. Pub. Serv. Commn. 1969); In re Georgia Power Co., 76 
P.U.R.3d 38 (Ga. Pub. Serv. Commn. 1968); In re Rules for Undergrounding of Elec. &: 
Communications Facilities, 74 P.U.R.3d 242 (Md. Pub. Serv. Commn. 1968), with 
Gimbel v. Loughlin, 28 Conn. Supp. 72, 250 A.2d 329 (1968); In re United Ilium. 
Co., 71 P.U.R.3d 257 (Conn. Pub. Util. Commn. 1967). See generally Aesthetics and 
Utility Line Construction, 84 PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 31, 1969, at 49. 
66. See generally J. SAX, WATER I.Aw, PLANNING AND POLICY 29-43 (1968); Fox &: 
Herfindahl, Attainment of Efficiency in Satisfying Demands for Water Resources, 54 Al,r, 
EcoN. REY. 198, 201-05 (Papers &: Proceedings) (1964). 
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bly prefer better service at greater cost; others would prefer a lower 
level of service at less cost. In some industries, both groups may be 
satisfied if the firm can offer various levels of service from the com-
mon plant. Thus, it is possible to obtain slow rail freight service at 
low rates and fast freight service at higher rates. In other instances, 
however, this solution is not possible. One consumer may be willing 
to put up with more telephone busy signals in exchange for lower 
rates; another may be willing to pay a great deal to be able to put 
his call through the first time. But unless the dissatisfied consumers 
are prepared to pay for an entirely separate telephone plant to serve 
them, they are forced to take the single level of service provided or 
no service at all. 
Economics can provide a solution for pieces of this problem but 
not for the whole. If the production function for the appropriate 
amount of service of various levels is known, one can by mathematical 
techniques maximize the level of service from a given amount of 
input, or minimize the amount of input necessary to produce a given 
level of service. But here neither the level of service nor the amount 
of input may be taken as given. An intuitive approximation of the 
appropriate level of service might be obtained if the demand func-
tions for various possible services were known, but, in the absence 
of a practical means of testing consumer desires in an actual market, 
the determination of demand functions is notoriously difficult.07 
Further, even if the commission could precisely quantify both the 
production and demand functions, economic theory as yet cannot 
give it any practical advice on how to determine the optimal cost-
service combination if there exists a genuine indivisibility, like the 
telephone plant which can provide only one level of service.08 
Perhaps because of its difficulty most commissions simply ignore 
the service problem and leave to the regulated company the job of 
setting service standards within a broad framework. 00 In the few pro-
ceedings in which the matter is considered, the commissions rely on 
essentially political mechanisms, such as consumer complaints or 
counsel for consumer groups, to substitute for the market and pro• 
vide a guide to consumer desires.70 While one might argue that 
67. Market surveys can be used but are quite imprecise. See generally W. BAUMOL, 
ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 210-49 (2d ed. 1965). 
68. Intuitively, it would seem that the commission should choose the level whicl1 
maximized consumer surplus, but that cltoice would be optimal only if the com• 
mission could ignore allocational effects on the rest of the economy. The area strikes 
me as one in need of further basic theoretical researclt. 
69. See In re American Tel. 8: Tel. Co., 9 F.C.C.2d 30, 122, 70 P.U.R.3d 129, 223 (1907) 
Gohnson, C., concurring), for a recognition of the problem. See also I A. KAHN, supra 
note 6, at 21-25; Posner, supra note 20, at 593-94, in CRISIS, supra note 2, at 30, 33. 
70. Thus, in the recent New York telephone "crisis," the Commission became pain• 
fully aware of the problem through the political uproar that occurred in the press 
over the deteriorating quality of service. Of course, this political mecltanism will re• 
spond only to those who have political voice while the market mecltanism responds 
io those with money. The two groups are not necessarily the same. 
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economic data about cost and demand, though imperfect, should 
also be used in such proceedings, the service standards area remains 
one in which economists currently cannot claim exclusive compe-
tence. 
Finally, it can be argued that regulation could be used to achieve 
economic goals other than allocational efficiency. We may, so the 
argument runs, be prepared to sacrifice efficiency in order to achieve 
such goals as full employment, stability, flexibility, or a market struc-
ture which has more than an optimal number of firms to reduce the 
political power of large firms. Conscious consideration of such objec-
tives is very rare in regulatory proceedings, although recently a few 
commissions, mixing micro- with macro-economic objectives, have 
said they considered the inflationary effect of granting a rate in-
crease. 71 Should the consideration of such nonallocational goals be-
come common, economic learning would still be relevant both for 
determining how much pursuit of the nonallocational goal was cost-
ing in efficiency terms and also because of the essentially economic 
nature of the nonallocational goal. 
Our examination of the four major areas in which goals of regu-
lation other than the approximation of allocation efficiency have 
been asserted reveals that we need not substantially qualify our initial 
proposition that the approximation of allocational efficiency is the 
sole goal of regulation. The historical goal of redistributive equity 
and the possible nonallocational economic goals play a small role in 
today's regulatory proceedings. The externalities problem illustrated 
by the Storm King case and the service standards problem prove 
upon examination to be areas in which allocational efficiency may 
well be the appropriate goal, but the difficulties of obtaining infor-
mation or the absence of a satisfactory theoretical solution make a 
quasi-political type of proceeding desirable. Even in these cases, 
however, economics is clearly relevant, and price and entry regula-
tion cases do not normally involve such ambiguous evaluations. 
Thus, one could have a regulatory system devoted almost solely to 
traditional economic issues and manned almost entirely by econ-
omists with legal participation confined to the occasional case which 
raised broader issues. We certainly have seen nothing so far which 
justifies the legal domination of the field of price and entry regula-
tion which we have today. 
B. Legal Issues in Regulation 
Up to this point, our review has developed the prima facie case 
for the withdrawal, or at least substantial retrenchment, of lawyers 
from the regulatory scene. Let us see if anything can be said for the 
legal profession by way of rebuttal. 
71. See, e.g., 51 TELECOMMUNICATIONS REP., Aug. 30, 1971, at 1-7 (examiner's opin-
ion). 
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Legal dominance of the regulated industries field is largely the 
product of historical accident. The first regulators were the legisla-
tures and the courts, institutions in which lawyers traditionally play 
a leading role.72 Administrative regulation was born at a time when 
there were substantial questions about its constitutionality. When 
President Cleveland was looking for a chairman for the newly formed 
ICC, he turned to the distinguished academic authority on constitu-
tional law and Michigan Supreme Court Justice, Thomas Cooley.73 
When the newer federal regulatory agencies were formed in the 
thirties, the prevailing profession in Washington was law. Today, 
however, the courts have largely abandoned the attempt to develop 
a substantive law of regulated industries as a subbranch of constitu-
tional law,74 and Washington is now teeming with young economists 
and other "quantitative" specialists who might be persuaded to go 
into the fi.eld.75 
Administrative procedure is, of course, a legal field, and nothing 
I have said here should be taken as arguing that economists would 
be better at it than lawyers. The lawyer's sense for and interest in 
process, however, may be responsible for diverting attention from the 
pressing substantive problems of the commissions. For example, Dean 
Landis' comprehensive review of the policies and practices of the 
federal regulatory agencies for then President-elect K.ennedy70 marked 
for many the beginning of a new concern with those agencies. Landis 
found that the "fourth branch" of government, the bright hope of 
the thirties, had become in the sixties a group of moribund agencies, 
bound tightly in their procedural rules and making decisions which 
were incomprehensible even to the participants. He cited the FPC's 
regulation of natural gas field prices as "a classic example of the 
breakdmvn of the administrative process."77 Landis' report was heav-
ily procedural in its recommendations, and many of these recommen-
dations were followed-yet the problems remain.78 Currently, the 
Ash Council recommendations of replacing the commissions with a 
single administrator, a rigid time frame for regulatory decisions, and 
a specialized appeals court have stirred up a whole new round of 
controversy about the organization and procedures of the agencies.70 
72. See W. JONES, supra note 56, at 26-43. 
73. 4 I. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 14 &: n.24 (1937). 
74. See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Nebbia v. New York, 291 
U.S. 502 (1934). 
75. Bickel, Lawyers b More Lawyers, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 23, 1967, at 24, 
76. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS,, LANDIS REPORT ON THE 
REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (Comm. Print 1960). ' 
77. Id. at 54. 
78. See CrusIS, supra note 2, at vii-viii. 
79. Compare ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXEC, ORG., A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK-
REPORT oN SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES (1971), with Views of the Ad· 
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Under the current lawyers'· dominance of the field, discussion of 
these procedural issues will probably continue to divert attention 
from the more pressing substantive problems discussed above. In-
deed, it can be argued that the lawyer's procedural focus continually 
diverts attention from the substance of regulatory issues. Lawyers 
are trained to deal with courts; they tend to think about adminis-
trative law solely in terms of judicial review. On the other hand, 
because the courts limit themselves, as a rule, to consideration of 
procedural questions on agency appeals, procedural questions bulk 
large in the lawyers' treatment of cases at the agency level. The re-
sulting procedural orientation not only diverts attention from sub-
stance, but has peculiar and annoying substantive repercussions. For 
example, the mishmash of numbers approach to rate of return, dis-
cussed earlier, 80 is at least in part the product of the commissions' 
desire to fortify their opinions against judicial review.81 
To say, moreover, that lawyers have something to contribute to 
the shaping of administrative procedure is not to say that they neces-
sarily should continue to dominate the practice. Anyone who has seen 
a regulatory lawyer cross-examining an economic witness-returning 
to the counsel table every other question to ask his economic witness 
what he ought to ask next-must have wondered if the whole process 
would not be better if the middleman were eliminated. Anyone who 
has seen a faithful government lawyer who has risen to the position 
of hearing examiner struggling over the meaning of "marginal 
cost" must have wondered if legal training and experience were the 
best preparation for the job. Even assuming that the basic outlines 
of agency procedure are to remain unchanged, there is nothing so 
mysterious about the conduct of an administrative proceeding, par-
ticularly under the relaxed rules of evidence which most agencies 
follow, that a qualified economist could not be trained to under-
take it. 82 If there is some valid reason for the domination of the 
regulatory process by lawyers, it certainly does not lie in the fact 
that the procedures of an administrative agency bear some vague re-
semblance to those of a court. 
ministrative Conference of the United States on the "Report on Selected Independent 
Regulatory Agencies" of the President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization 
(mimeo May 7, 1971), and Welch, Pages with the Editor, 87 PUB. UTIL. FORT. March 
18, 1971, at 4; id., April 15, 1971, at 4; id., June 24, 1971, at 4. 
80. See text accompanying note 32 supra. 
81. See Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for a Better 
Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REv. 863, 881; id. 1055, 1056, 1084-87; id. 1263, 
1294-95 (1962), in THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 23, 54, 86-91, 142-43 (1962); 
Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE 
L.J. 931 (1960). 
82. At least one administrative agency, the FCC, bas had a staff team of a lawyer 
and an economist conduct part of an administrative proceeding. See 35 TELEC0MMU-
NlCATIONS REP., Sept. 15, i969, at 4-5. 
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Of course the charters of the regulatory commissions are to be 
found in statutes. These define and limit with some precision the 
jurisdiction and powers of the commissions. Jurisdictional questions 
are important and will continue to remain the concern of la'wyers, 
although even here economics should play a role-a lesson taught 
by the natural gas field price problem. So far as the commissions' 
specific powers are concerned, however, they are usually so broad 
that any sophisticated commission can normally achieve any result 
it wishes by exercising authority given by one or the other of them. 
Certainly in the areas of price and entry regulation the statutory 
language, even with its accumulated judicial interpretation, gives the 
commission enough latitude that no significant constraint is imposed 
on its actions.83 
The last argument I will mention for the lawyer's participation 
in the regulatory process revolves around the public nature of the 
proceedings. Under our system of government, it is argued, deci-
sions that have the great impact that regulatory decisions can have 
on both business and the consuming public are required to be made 
on an open record and subject to judicial review.84 In such a process 
the lawyer's training as an advocate ensures that the arguments for 
the interests he represents are best presented to the decision-maker 
and makes him more effective than any economist could be. The 
major premise of the argument needs some refinement. No one has 
ever seriously suggested that the Federal Reserve Board conduct a 
legal proceeding before changing the discount rate, an act which has 
an economic impact greater than even the most major of rate and en-
try proceedings. Where, however, the Government issues an order or 
makes a decision adjudicating a specific question involving a private 
individual or firm, as it does in the typical price or entry case, ad-
versary proceedings are normally required. We have seen that such 
proceedings have not been particularly appropriate for developing 
the statistical information that is critical to price and entry proceed-
ings. Assuming, however, that major changes in the adversary nature 
of the proceedings will not occur, is there anything, aside from the 
absurd argument that only lawyers are ethical, about the advocate's 
role which requires that the advocate be a lawyer?85 If the issues 
83. See Posner, supra note 20, at 592-93, in Crusis, supra note 2, at 30-32. 
84. See Cramton, supra note 62, at 185-86, in DIRECTIONS, supra note 6, at 255-56. 
85. Lest I be accused of totally missing the boat, let me say that I am painfully 
aware, of a substantial body of state cases which hold that only a lawyer can reprc• 
sent another individual or a corporation in a regulatory proceeding. The universal 
presence of the organized bar either as plaintiff-prosecutor or amicus in such cases can 
only raise the suspicion that the most primitive guild instincts of the organized bar arc 
at stake, and the weakness of the opinions does nothing to dispel those suspicions. Some 
cases offer no rationale at all (e.g., Denver Bar Assn. v. Colorado Pub. Util. Commn., 
154 Colo. 273, 391 P.2d 467 (1964)); others rest on the naked assertion that commission 
proceedings are "quasi-judicial" (e.g., Public Serv. Commn. v. Hahn Transp., Inc., 253 
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at stake are purely economic, cannot the economist, given a small 
amount of training, marshal and present the arguments as well as 
or better than the lawyer? 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I conclude, then, that (1) the goal of price and entry regulation is, 
in the vast majority of cases, the economic one of efficient resource 
allocation; (2) the technical tools for achieving this goal are chiefly 
economists' tools; and (3) the legal profession has not done a good job 
of achieving these goals or even of using these tools. These conclu-
sions lead to a further conclusion: the end of legal dominance of 
price and entry regulation in favor of economic dominance. That 
does not mean that lawyers should be barred from regulatory pro-
ceedings or from serving on regulatory commissions. The possible 
presence of a Storm King type of issue or of a complex procedural 
or statutory issue makes that solution unwise. None of the justifica-
tions for occasional legal participation in regulatory" proceedings, 
however, affect my basic conclusion that economists should play a 
far greater role in the process than they do today. 
What I have proposed, even as qualified above, is probably 
utopian. The more economically oriented of the recent task force 
reports on economic regulation suggested merely that one economist 
be appointed to serve on each of the regulatory commissions and 
even that recommendation does not seem to have been followed. 86 
Yet the replacement of lawyers by economists in regulation is a goal 
worth striving for not only because economists would probably do a 
better job, but also because lawyers' training is being wasted in 
doing it. 
Md. 571, 253 A.2d 845 (1969)): and some rest on the proposition that only lawyers are 
learned: 
While, in order to acquire the education necessary to gain admission to the bar 
and thereby become eligible to practice law, one is obliged to "scorn delights, 
and live laborious days," the object of the legislation forbidding practice to lay-
men is not to secure to lawyers a monopoly, however deserved, but, by preventing 
the intrusion of inexpert and unlearned persons in the practice of law, to as-
sure to the public adequate protection in the pursuit of justice, than which so-
ciety knows no loftier aim. 
Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa. 81, 91, 193 A. 20, 24 (1937). See Chicago :Bar Assn. v. Kellogg, 
338 Ill. App. 618, 88 N.E.2d 519 (1949); State ex rel. Johnson v. Childe, 147 Neb.·527, 23 
N.W.2d 720 (1946). The situation at the federal level is considerably more open. Many 
administrative agencies permit nonlawyers to practice before them. See Vom :Baur, 
Administrative Agencies and Unauthorized Practice of Law, 48 A.B.A.J. 715 (1962); 
Vom :Baur, Practice Before Administrative Agencies and the Unauthorized Practice of 
Law, 15 FED. 13.J. 103 (1955). And the Supreme Court has held that the states may not 
interfere on unauthorized practice grounds with the practice of those duly admitted be-
fore a federal agency. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), noted in 1964 WIS. L. 
REV. 469. It seems relatively clear, therefore, that the only legal obstacle to my recom-
mendation at the federal level is the rules of the agencies themselves. In many states, 
however, my recommendation must be directed to the organized bar and the legislature. 
86. See STIGLER TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 61, at 208. 
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Viewing our role .as lawyers as broadly as possible, we are trained 
to manipulate the stream of ideas of a society and to fit those ideas 
to specific human facts. Despite the important contributions of psy-
chology to family and criminal law and despite the importance of 
medical or engineering evidence in tort law, we remain predominant 
in these fields, because we can effectively fit the concepts of those 
corollary disciplines into a stream of accumulated case law, statutes, 
and general societal wisdom and apply the results to the ever-changing 
human situations before us. But no such task is presented by price 
and entry regulation. Accumulated societal wisdom reduces in this 
field to one almost plaintive charge: achieve, as closely as possible, 
an optimal resource allocation. Nor are the facts to be dealt with 
the specific human ones of the tort, criminal, or family proceeding. 
They are on a remoter plane; they are the trends and averages de-
duced from masses of numbers. With all the other areas in which 
society needs legal skills, surely we can leave this one to those who 
are trained for it. 
